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of Different Fleet Size Reduction Policies
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Abstract  This study compares the harvest capacity of Taiwan’s offshore fishing
fleet to sustainable yields of offshore fisheries and evaluates different legis-
lative strategies designed to reduce the fishing fleet. Aggregate offshore
fisheries’ stock changes and harvest functions are specified and estimated.
Results show that the stock has been declining since 1973. Based on dy-
namic simulations, this study shows that neither the program to restrict the
building of new vessels nor a combination of this program with the vessel
retirement and buy back program is sufficient to avoid the downward trend
in harvests and the deteriorating state of stocks. While reducing fishing ef-
fort to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) level might suffice as an initial
vessel reduction measure, attaining MSY within 5 to 10 years seems prefer-
able over a one-year approach. The long-run economic situation would be
further improved by an additional reduction of fishing effort to the optimal
yield (OY) level.
Key words   Aggregate stock change and harvest function, maximum sustainable
yield (MSY), offshore fishery, optimal yield (OY), Taiwan.
Introduction
In order to maintain the sustainability of Taiwan’s offshore fisheries stocks and to
avoid overfishing, Taiwan has implemented a fisheries management policy which
regulates harvests by suspending fishing licenses, restricts construction of fishing
vessels, and buys back used vessels in order to reduce the offshore fleet size.
The offshore fisheries harvests in Taiwan reached a peak in 1978, after which
they began to decrease. If this decrease is the result of overfishing, as is very prob-
able, then this downward trend is likely to continue. On the other hand, the number
of fishing vessels, total vessel tonnage, and total horsepower of vessels increased at
least until 1989. In 1993, adjusted offshore fisheries harvests, vessel numbers, total
vessel tonnage, and total horsepower were 5.5, 3.2, 7.8, and 35.2 times greater, re-
spectively, than in 1953. Since the average harvest per vessel ton has followed a de-
creasing trend after 1963, there is a tendency towards overcapitalization.
In response to this situation, four amendments that regulate the number of off-
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shore fishing vessels in Taiwan were enacted in 1967, 1980, 1989, and 1991.1 The
most recent measure, which is still in effect, restricts the construction of all fishing
vessels, except for fish transport vessels over 2,000 tons. Furthermore, a major revi-
sion of the Fisheries Law2 in 1991 gave the government the explicit right to adjust
the fishing effort according to resource abundance. The government has the right to
limit the number of vessels, total vessel tonnage, fishing area, fishing period, and all
other aspects of fishing vessel management policy for the following reasons: (1)
fisheries conservation; (2) fisheries structural adjustment; and (3) restrictions result-
ing from international agreements or cooperation.
In 1991, in addition to the overall restriction on the construction of fishing ves-
sels, the government adopted a voluntary vessel retirement and buy back program in
order to reduce Taiwan’s fleet size (Taiwan Fisheries Bureau 1992–94). The ques-
tions that remain, however, are how to evaluate the impact of the current vessel re-
duction management programs and how to determine the optimal reduction scheme
that reaches maximum sustainable yield (MSY) or optimal yield (OY) most effi-
ciently.
Since the fishing industry pays nothing to access the fish, and because fisheries
resources are somewhat scarce, fishing effort tends to be excessive (Hannesson
1993). A successful vessel reduction program should be based on maintaining the
sustainability of the fisheries stocks while adjusting harvests. Fisheries regulations
covering vessel and fleet operations are necessary and should be a combination of
government policies and programs which limit open access to the resource and man-
age access according to optimal timing patterns (Anderson 1986).
Many countries ostensibly set out to reduce the capacity of their fishing fleets
with the intent of increasing long-term industry profits. For example, as part of an
EU multi-annual guidance program, MAGP III was announced by the European Par-
liament in 1993, which is a four-year decommissioning scheme introduced in En-
gland, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales (OECD 1997). The decommissioning
was viewed as a “necessary evil” because reducing the aging fleet profile was the
first step in the long-term plan for the industry (Fishing News 1995).
The purpose of this study is to estimate MSY, maximum economic yield (MEY),
and OY for Taiwan’s offshore fisheries and to evaluate the impact of current vessel
reduction programs. First, aggregate fisheries stock dynamics and a harvest function
are established. The Schaefer model, which features a primitive Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function and a logistic growth equation, has often been used by economists
concerned with harvest functions for fisheries (Anderson 1986; Clark 1990;
Hannesson 1983; Opsomer and Conrad 1994; Schaefer 1954; Comitini and Huang
1967; Hannesson 1983; Tomkins and Butlin 1975; Tsoa, Schrank and Roy 1984). A
variant of this model is used to evaluate the effect of alternative vessel reduction
programs. The intention is to provide the offshore fishing industry with alternative
perspectives for its future and to help government policymakers evaluate the impact
of alternative vessel reduction policies.
1 For example, in 1967, in order to prevent any further increase in the existing number of pair trawlers
under 120 tons and otter trawlers under 200 tons, the Council of Agriculture applied measures to restrict the
construction of both types of trawlers (Department of Agriculture and Forestry 1993). In 1989, the Council of
Agriculture further amended the already existing fishing boat building restrictions to accept only: tuna
purse seiners over 1,000 tons, group purse seiners for mackerel, fish transporting vessels of 2,000 tons
and over, and factory vessels of 2,000 tons and over (Department of Agriculture and Forestry 1993).
2 In 1990, the Council of Agriculture drafted an “Adjustment Measure on Offshore Fisheries.” Under
this measure, assistance was rendered to fishermen who would otherwise have utilized the migratory re-
sources of pelagic and sub-pelagic stocks. This relieved the pressure on demersal stocks, thereby achiev-
ing the goal of gradually directing fishery development from resource consumption to resource conser-
vation (Department of Agriculture and Forestry 1990).Optimal Number of Fishing Vessels 277
Data
Yearly aggregate offshore fisheries data obtained from the Taiwan Fisheries Bureau
for the period 1978 to 1994 are used to establish aggregate fisheries dynamic move-
ments and harvest functions. Annual offshore fisheries harvest quantities, production
values, and aggregate data on fishing vessels were obtained from the Fisheries Year-
book for Taiwan Area for the period 1953 to 1993,3 which is the most recent data
available (Taiwan Fisheries Bureau 1978–94). Aggregate data on fishing vessels in-
cludes the number of fishing vessels, vessel tonnage, and average horsepower per
vessel ton for motor powered fishing units.
Offshore fisheries are defined as powered vessels fishing within the Economic
Exclusive Zone (EEZ) around Taiwan, which is under the Taiwan’s jurisdiction by
the Law of Fishery. Fishing vessels smaller than 100 tons, which are owned by indi-
vidual families or small-scale fishing companies, primarily operate in Taiwan’s off-
shore fishery. Some of these small-scale, individual vessels switch back and forth
between two or more types of fishing gear, according to season and target species.
For target species that have a short life cycle, such as the small subpelagics, the pro-
portional representation of the different species is fairly constant. Although
Taiwan’s offshore fisheries catch a variety of species, the available data represent
only aggregate catch quantities. Consequently, the output side is defined over one
composite output variable, aggregate catch quantity.
Empirically, since there are overlapping problems with mainland China and Ja-
pan regarding the EEZ fishing grounds, it may also pose a problem to use total har-
vest and fishing effort directly. Therefore, removal of three types of fishing fleets
from the harvest and fishing effort (purse seine mackerel,4 longline tuna, and trawl
fishing fleets with vessels that are over 50 tons and freezer equipped) is proposed in
order to avoid the overlapping problems. After this modification, the remaining off-
shore fishing vessels will then operate anywhere from 12 to approximately 100 nau-
tical miles around Taiwan, which is under Taiwan’s jurisdiction, solving the problem
of overlapping fishing grounds with mainland China and Japan. This is especially
true for three types of fishing fleets with vessels smaller than 100 tons, which may
target transboundary or large pelagic stocks or may operate beyond the 200 nautical
mile zone around Taiwan.
The cost and revenue data for the different tonnage classes of offshore fishing
vessels were obtained from the database released by the Annual Economic Survey of
Offshore Fisheries and Aquaculture (Taiwan Fisheries Bureau 1992). The revenue
and cost data are used to approximate the revenue-cost ratios for fishing vessels in
the different tonnage classes. A weighted average revenue-cost ratio is calculated ac-
cording to the distribution of the offshore fishing vessels in the different tonnage
classes as follows:































where ratio = weighted average revenue-cost ratio; Ri = average revenue per vessel
ton of the ith ton class (NT$/vessel ton); Ci = average cost per vessel ton of the ith
ton class (NT$/vessel ton); Ai = percentage of total fishing vessel tonnage repre-
3 Aggregate data on fishing vessels for the period 1977 to 1984 were obtained from the Fishing Vessel
Yearbook since they were not included in the Fisheries Yearbook for those years.
4 This fishery started in 1977 and is operated by the eight fishing fleets. Each fleet is comprised of two
light vessels, two shipment vessels, and one purse seine vessel.Sun 278
sented by vessels the ith ton class, where 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 represent 0–5 tons, 5–10
tons, 10–20 tons, 20–50 tons, and 50–100 tons, respectively.
In 1992, the percentages of total vessel tonnage for the five tonnage classes
were 5.16%, 8.42%, 19.67%, 58.16%, and 8.59%, respectively (table 1). The aver-
age harvest per vessel ton was 1,698 kg, and the average harvest value5 per vessel
ton was NT$112,569. When factoring out the cost of equipment, depreciation and
interest cost of capital, the average cost per vessel ton was NT$98,522, and the
short-term variable cost6 was NT$69,336.
The revenue/cost ratio for each of the five tonnage classes ranges from 1.02 to
1.38, with a weighted average of 1.14 (table 1). This means that the average fishing
fleet earns a profit. However, the revenue/cost ratio declines as the vessel tonnage
increases, which illustrates the phenomenon of overcapitalization (Sun 1995). While
it may be true that smaller vessels are more profitable, it is also conceivable that
larger vessels could be more profitable if the fisheries were less exploited.
The short-term revenue/cost ratio, which is defined as the average revenue di-
vided by the average variable cost, ranges from 1.50 to 2.31, with a weighted aver-
age of 1.62. Thus, when average fixed costs (i.e., equipment depreciation and cost of
interest) are not taken into account, which is not the case in the short-run, the aver-
age fishing vessel earns a profit. The government will, therefore, have to provide
very attractive vessel reduction incentives before fishermen will relinquish such lu-
crative, short-term fishing opportunities.
5 Averaging harvest value assumes that prices for different species were relatively constant over the
sample period in 1992.
6 According to the original data source, this includes all direct and indirect costs. The annual variable
cost per vessel ton includes fuel, bait, ice, salt, water, box/basket, food, fish market administration and
fee, transportation and storage charge, repair and replacement of fishing gear, salary, and interest cost of
a revolving fund.
Table 1
Offshore Fisheries Production, Revenue, and Cost in Taiwan, 1992
Average Average Average Average Revenue- Short- Percentage
Yield Revenue Cost Variable Cost Term of
per per per Cost per Ratio Revenue- Total
Vessel Vessel Vessel Vessel Cost Vessel
Ton Ton Ton Ton Ratio Ton
Various (kg/Ves. (NT$/Ves. (NT$/Ves. (NT$/Ves.
Tonnage Tons) Tons) Tons) Tons)
Classes (O) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Under 5 tons 2,362 188,442 136,136 81,242 1.38 2.31 5.16%
5–10 tons 2,339 146,777 121,037 81,081 1.21 1.81 8.42%
10–20 tons 1,972 135,705 121,214 83,813 1.11 1.61 19.67%
20–50 tons 1,523 99,349 88,731 65,943 1.11 1.5 58.16%
50–100 tons 1,226 69,993 68,187 40,498 1.02 1.72 8.59%
Weighted average 1,698 112,569 98,522 69,336 1.14 1.62 –
a Annual Economics Survey of Offshore Fisheries and Aquaculture in Taiwan, 1992, Taiwan Fisheries Bureau.
b (Di) = (Ai)/(Bi), (Ei) = (Ai)/(Ci)
c Fisheries Yearbook in Taiwan Area, 1992, Taiwan Fisheries Bureau.
d Weighted average of percentage of total tonnage, the formula equals to  () kf ii i × ∑ = 1
5 , where k = (A),
(B), (C), (D), (E); i = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5; 1 represents vessels under 5 tons; 2 represents vessels approxi-
mately 5–10 tons; 3 represents vessels approximately 10–20 tons; 4 represents vessels approximately
20–50 tons; and 5 represents vessels approximately 50–100 tons.Optimal Number of Fishing Vessels 279
Model Specification
This study specifies a generalized harvest function which permits the estimation of
an unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function (Comitini and Huang 1967;
Hannesson 1983; Tomkins and Butlin 1975; Tsoa, Schrank and Roy 1984):
YH X E A E X tt t t
q
tt == (,) α β  (1)
where Yt is the offshore fisheries harvest in period t; H(Xt, Et) is the harvest function
which depends on Xt and Et. The variable Xt represents an assessment of offshore
fisheries resource stock; Et represents the fishing effort, which is defined as total
vessel tonnage of the offshore fisheries in period t. The variable At represents the
technological efficiency of the offshore fisheries in period t. Technological effi-
ciency is defined as the improvement of fishing gear, such as replacing engines with
more efficient ones to improve fishing yields. Finally, q, α , β  are parameters which
represent the scale elasticities associated with technological efficiency, fishing ef-
fort, and resource stock, respectively.
Suppose that the growth function of the fisheries resource stock in period t is
specified as a logistic growth function, G(Xt–1), which depends on the biomass of the
fisheries in the previous period (Schaefer 1954). Hence, the dynamic movement of
the fisheries resource stock is specified as follows:
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where r is the intrinsic growth rate, and K is the environmental carrying capacity.
Using equation (1), a function for the resource stock of the fisheries in period
t – 1, (Xt–1) can be substituted into equation (2), so that the resource stock of the off-












































By substituting equation (3) into equation (1), the current period harvest func-
tion for offshore fisheries is specified as a function of the previous period’s harvest,
























































Suppose the error term is multiplicative normal,7 then the empirical model is
specified as follows:
7 Uhler assumed that the above model contains two stochastic processes—the harvesting process and the
growth process—each process has its own error terms (Uhler 1980). Note that even if these error terms are
normally distributed, the composite error terms for the combined model may not be normally distributed.Sun 280





















































where µ t is the composite error term, and estimates of q, α , β , r, and (r/K) are ob-
tained via maximum likelihood estimation.8
Fisheries harvests are measured in tons, and fishing effort is measured in units
of 10,000 vessel tons. The log of the average horsepower per vessel is a variable
representing technological efficiency. Note that many simplifying assumptions have
been made in this analysis. For example, the dynamics of the fish stock could be
based on other biological or ecological models. Also, mandated changes in fishing
effort and total vessel tonnage were assumed to be implemented fully according to
government regulations.
Model Estimation and Results
Since the fisheries harvest function is specified as a nonlinear model, maximum
likelihood estimation is used. The estimates are reported in table 2. The signs and
magnitudes of all the estimates agree reasonably well with bioeconomic theory. All
coefficients are significant, except the coefficient associated with technological effi-
ciency.9 The root mean square percentage errors (RMSPE)10 of the above model is
0.57%. The Theil Inequality Coefficients for variance and covariance are 0.003 and
0.997, respectively, indicating that the estimated model can generate simulations
that are highly correlated with actual outcomes.
The following parameters can be calculated from the results in table 2. Using
the estimated intrinsic growth rate (r = 0.3102) and the estimate of (r/K), which is
1.0184E10–7, the environmental carrying capacity (K) is estimated at 3,045,995 tons.
The approximated standard error and t statistics of K are 788,004.5 tons and 3.97,
respectively, so that the p-value is approximately 0.0003. Since MSY equals (rK/4),
and the resource stock of the offshore fisheries at MSY equals (K/2), MSY and fish-
eries resource stock at MSY can be estimated to be 236,221 tons and 1,522,977 tons,
respectively.
When using 1993 values for technological efficiency, the predicted required
vessel tonnage at MSY is 100,800 vessel tons. Comparing this to the actual vessel
tonnage for 1993, which was 164,447 vessel tons, suggests that Taiwan’s offshore
fisheries are currently overcapitalized.
The optimal number of fishing vessels will change as technological efficiency
changes. By substituting MSY (rK/4) for the current harvest level, Yt, in the general-
ized harvest function, equation (1), we can define a compound effort coefficient (e),
where e =  AE t
q
t
α , which is an index of vessel catching power under different levels
8 The intercept was excluded because the likelihood ratio test was not significant under the null hypoth-
eses of including the intercept.
9 Omitting the logged average vessel horsepower variable, At, in equation (5) would result in the rejec-
tion of the likelihood ratio test H0: b0 = 0.
10 The root-mean-square percentage errors (RMSPE) measure is computed as:
RMPSE
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where YSt is the simulated value of endogenous variable Y, YAt is the actual historic value for endog-
enous variable Y, and T is the number of periods in the simulation.Optimal Number of Fishing Vessels 281
of technological efficiency. At MSY, e = 2.952. When the actual compound effort
coefficient for each year is compared with this ideal value, 1973 emerges as the year
that actual harvest was equal to MSY. In addition, simulation of the stock of
Taiwan’s offshore fisheries for the past 20 years indicates a clear and steady decline
since then.
Estimating Maximum Economic Yield and Optimal Yield
Suppose that the offshore industry net benefit is specified as:
Π (Xt, Yt) = R(Xt, Yt) – C(Xt, Yt)  (6)
where Π (Xt, Yt) is the offshore industry net benefit in period t; R(Xt, Yt) is the rev-
enue function p ·Yt; C(Xt, Yt) is the cost function; c ·Et; p is the weighted average
harvest price (NT$/kg); and c is the average cost per unit of fishing effort (NT$/ves-
sel ton). Note that by assuming the stability of price, p, the dynamic movement of
price is not specified in the current optimization problem. Then, the industry net
benefit function is defined as:
Π (Xt, Et) = p · H(Xt, Et) – c · Et  (7)
and the short-run net benefit function is defined as:
Π S(Xt, Et) = p · H(Xt, Et) – vc · Et  (8)
where vc is the variable cost of fishing effort.
Suppose the discount rate is represented by δ , and the discrete time discount factor,
ρ , equals [1/(1 + δ )]. The problem of maximizing total industry net benefit across time
with respect to Xt and Yt is then defined as:







which is subject to the generalized harvest function as defined by equation (1) and
the fisheries growth function. This is specified in the same way as the logistic
growth function that comprises the first term in equation (2).
Now the problem of maximizing industry net benefits over time becomes:
Table 2
Estimates of a Generalized Production Function of Offshore Fisheries in Taiwan
Parameters Estimates Asy. Std. Error t-value p-value
α 0.5221 0.2121 2.46 0.0189*
β 0.7937 0.0554 14.33 0.0001*
r 0.3102 0.0831 3.73 0.0007*
r/K 1.0184E–7 5.132E–8 1.98 0.0551*
q 0.0828 0.2166 0.38 0.7044
No. of Obs. = 40 Log-Likelihood = 49.57 σ2 = 0.0056 R2 = 0.9849 Adj. R2 = 0.9832
Note: * Significance under the 5% level.Sun 282
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s.t.  Xt+1 – Xt = G(Xt) – H(Xt, Et)
X(0) = X0
with a current value Hamiltonian as defined by:
˜ H(Xt, Yt; u) = Π (Xt, Yt) + u[G(Xt) – Yt]  (10)
where u is the shadow price which represents the marginal return of the slackness of
the resource constraint.
Under a steady-state equilibrium, the first order conditions of the optimal yield










G(X) – H(X, E) = 0  (12)
where G′ (X), HX, and HE are the first partial derivatives of each function, and the
weighted average harvest price (p) and the average cost per unit of fishing effort (c)
are obtained from table 1. The implicit function which defines XOY and EOY in equa-
tions (11) and (12) can be simplified as:
f(X, E) = 0  (13)
Solving the net industry benefit equation with a discount rate of zero would
provide us an estimate of MEY. In this case, the necessary sacrifice of current
benefits does not affect the optimization decision because the ultimate gain, no
matter how small or how long it is delayed, lasts forever, and, not being dis-
counted, outweighs any current loss (Clark 1990).
A more realistic model would consider the fisheries a capital stock, and, in
order to find the OY, a dynamic optimization would be specified in which the
discount rate is not equal to zero. Conrad and Clark (1987) point out that the
definition of MSY ignores the social and economic reasons for maintaining
fisheries resources, and that MEY criterion ignores time preference; i.e., in re-
ality the discount rate is not equal to zero (Clark 1985; 1990).
Since the estimate of resource stock at OY depends on the discount rate and
other economic and biological parameters of the optimal problem, it may be
greater or less than that at MSY. However, a “most-rapid” approach policy
would drive the stock to the optimal level as rapidly as possible and would sac-
rifice current production, potentially ignoring the welfare or employment op-
portunities of fishermen.
In practice, an analysis of the profit structure of the offshore fisheries indi-
cates that the average product price and average cost are 66.30 NT$/kg and
NT$98,522/vessel ton, respectively (table 1). If the level of technological effi-
ciency is held constant at the 1993 level, then estimates of fisheries harvest,Optimal Number of Fishing Vessels 283
fishing effort, and resource stock level at OY can be obtained from the implicit
function theorem by simulating Xt and Et nonlinearly to satisfy equation (13).11
Assuming a 0% or 10% discount rate, the MEY and OY are plotted in figure 1
and detailed in table 3.
The relationship between fisheries resource stock, fishing effort, and fisher-
ies harvest under the MSY, MEY, and OY is as follows:
XMSY < XOY < XMEY  (14)
EMSY > EOY > EMEY  (15)
and
YMSY > YOY > YMEY  (16)
Of the three simulated scenarios above, MEY provides the highest profit, NT$8.9
billion. The actual aggregate profit using 1993 figures shows a deficit of NT$2.9
billion (table 3).
The fisheries resource stock at MEY is 2,132,991 tons, which is greater than
that at MSY. However, the level of fishing effort at MEY is 43,012 tons, which is
lower than that under MSY. The fact that the MEY harvest level is almost equal to
the actual harvest reported for 1993 suggests that by reducing fishing effort to the
MEY level, offshore fisheries harvests could be maintained at close to current har-
vest levels, but aggregate profit would be significantly improved due to increased
fisheries stock, decreased fishing effort, and decreased total cost.
11 Using a grid search conducted under the GAUSS statistics program.
Figure 1. Estimates of MSY, MEY, and OY of the Offshore Fisheries in TaiwanSun 284
Policy Simulations
In this section, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the vessel retirement and buy
back program is provided (Department of Agriculture and Forestry 1993). This pro-
gram was in effect from 1991 to 1993. Vessels that were over fifteen years old were
purchased at prices higher than their scrap value. In addition, simulation of several
long-run equilibrium vessel reduction scenarios is presented.
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Vessel Retirement and Buy Back Program
In 1991, the government began restricting the building of new vessels. A simulation
of the impact on offshore fisheries harvests of the program to restrict the building of
new vessels, with or without the vessel retirement and buy back program, is evalu-
ated from the simulations as follows:
Scenario 1. If the government did not apply the vessel retirement and buy back pro-
gram in 1991, fisheries harvests for the following years could be simulated by as-
suming that total vessel tons and technological efficiency remained at 1991 levels.
This scenario serves as a base case.
Scenario 2. Assume that the government applies the vessel retirement and buy back
program from 1991 to 1993. After that time, there is no follow-up program except
for a continued restriction on the building of new vessels for an additional ten years.
Both the fisheries stock and fisheries harvests decline steadily under the base
case. In the short-term, harvests are lower under Scenario 2 than Scenario 1. Al-
though the second scenario also predicts declining stocks and harvests levels, it is,
nevertheless, preferable to the base case because the declines are smaller in the
long-term. Neither strategy, however, is sufficient to avoid the downward trend in
fisheries harvests and the deteriorating state of the fisheries stock. In addition, the



















where the base year is set in 1993, and δ  = 0.08. The yearly profit is calculated as
total revenue minus total cost, which includes variable and fixed costs. The short-
Table 3
Comparison of the Estimates of the Offshore Fisheries
Production, Vessel Tons, Resource, and Aggregate Profit Under
Actual Production in 1993, MSY, OY, and MEY in Taiwan
Estimates Production in 1993 MSY OY MEY
Production (Tons) 201,157 236,221 209,238 197,569
Vessel Tons (Tons) 164,447 100,800 51,742 43,012
Resource (Tons) 900,991 1,522,977 2,029,991 2,132,991
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 Profit is calculated as total revenue minus total cost, which includes variable and fixed costs.
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), where the base year is set in 1993, and δ
 = 0.08.
3
 Short-term profit is calculated as total revenue minus variable cost only
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term profit is calculated as total revenue less variable cost only. According to
the NPV in the first simulation for 1990 through 2003, Scenario 2 increases the
NPV of profit more than Scenario 1. However, under Scenario 2, even though
the NPV of short-term profit is positive, Scenario 2’s NPV of profit (long-term)
is still negative. Therefore, a passive vessel retirement and buy back program is
determined to be an ineffective resource stock recovery program.
Evaluation of Long-run Equilibrium Vessel Reduction Scenarios
Given the current status of the offshore fisheries, it seems prudent to reduce
fishing effort to a level equivalent to or below MSY in order to improve stock
sustainability. Reducing fishing effort will cause stocks to recover. MSY is a
more clear and tangible target than OY. While reducing fishing effort to the
MSY level might suffice as an initial vessel-reduction measure, the long-run
economic situation would be further improved by an additional reduction of
fishing effort to the OY level.
Suppose that starting in 1994, the government implemented a vessel reduc-
tion program aimed at maintaining fisheries harvests at MSY levels for the
long-run. In addition, suppose that fishing effort and total vessel tonnage was
fully adjusted according to government regulations, and that technological effi-
ciency was held at 1993 levels. Five different long-run equilibrium vessel re-
duction scenarios present themselves:
Scenario 1. Apply a vessel reduction program in 1994 to reduce total vessel
tons to 100,800 tons (MSY level) in one year.
Scenario 2. Apply a vessel reduction program in 1994 to reduce total vessel
tons to 100,800 tons within five years.
Scenario 3. Apply a vessel reduction program in 1994 to reduce total vessel
tons to 100,800 tons within ten years.
Scenario 4. Apply a vessel reduction program in 1994 to reduce total vessel
tons to 100,800 tons within fifteen years.
Scenario 5. Hold the total vessel tonnage at the 1993 level (the base scenario).
Simulation results show that, except for Scenario 5, all other scenarios pre-
dict a steady increase in the fisheries stock. The first, second, and third sce-
narios result in a sharp drop in fisheries harvests. However, fisheries harvests
under these scenarios increase later. The fourth and the fifth scenarios, on the
other hand, result in a steady decline of fisheries harvests over the next fifteen
years. The net present value (NPV) of each scenario is reported in table 4, and
Scenario 1 is the most profitable.
The substitutability between offshore harvest and imported fish is quite
high in Taiwan. Whenever domestic prices increase, foreign imports increase,
thus price stabilizes. Therefore, the price for fish in Taiwan is quite stable even
though there might be a serious reduction in harvest of offshore fisheries in the
future. In practical terms, attaining MSY within five to ten years, Scenarios 2
and 3, is preferable over the one-year approach, Scenario 1, because harvest re-Optimal Number of Fishing Vessels 287
12 In the short-run, severe harvest reductions represent unemployment of offshore fishermen by assum-
ing the average price of fish is stable.
ductions would be less severe in the first five to ten years.12 In addition, off-
shore fisheries stock declines are prevented. Implementing the program over ten
years, Scenarios 4 and 5, will not provide an effective solution.
Conclusions
This study compares the harvest capacity of Taiwan’s offshore fishing fleet to
sustainable yields of these offshore fisheries and evaluates different legislative
strategies designed to reduce fishing fleets. First, aggregate fisheries stock dy-
namics and harvest functions are specified and estimated by using yearly har-
vest and fishing effort data from 1953 to 1993. Results show that the offshore
fisheries stock in Taiwan starts to decline in 1973, and that the offshore fisher-
ies are overharvested. The actual harvest level in 1993 is less than estimates of
MSY and OY, but higher than MEY. The estimate of fisheries stock under the
MSY level is less than stock under the OY level, and the estimate of effort un-
der the MSY level is greater than effort under the OY level.
Based on dynamic simulations, this study evaluates the impact of alterna-
tive vessel-reduction policies. The results determined by this study can provide
government agencies with predictions of the impact of alternative regulations
concerning the number of fishing vessels, while taking into account both stock
abundance and economic conditions. This study also concludes that neither the
program to restrict the building of new vessels nor a combination of this pro-
gram with the vessel retirement and buy back program is sufficient to avoid a
downward trend in fisheries harvests or to allow for the recovery of declining
fish stocks.
Given the current status of Taiwan’s offshore fisheries, a reduction in fish-
ing effort will lead to the recovery of fish stocks. The MSY is a clear and man-
ageable target that needs to be reached before pursuing OY. While MSY might
suffice as an initial vessel reduction target, the long-run economic condition of
the fishing industry would be further improved by reducing fishing effort to the
OY level. Attaining MSY within five to ten years is preferable over a one-year
approach, because harvest reductions would be less severe and the decline of
offshore fisheries stocks would still be prevented.
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